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INTRODUCTION
Professor Elyn Saks1 is a well-recognized expert in mental health
law, having published articles, books, and book chapters on such topics
as outpatient commitment, 2 competency to refuse treatment,3 and the
criminal responsibility of people with multiple personality disorder.4
Saks is also training to become a psychoanalyst. 5- Her latest book
reflects her continued interest in mental health issues, but this book
* Assistant Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law. J.D., Vanderbilt
University Law School; M.A. (Psychology), University of Pennsylvania; B.A.,
Swarthmore College. The author thanks Michael Ariens, John Teeter, and
Reynaldo Valencia for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Responsibility for
all errors is, of course, the author's alone.
1 Associate Dean and Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, Psychology, and
Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sciences, USC Gould School of Law, University
of Southern California. http://law.usc.edu/contact/contactinfo.cftn?detailid=300.
2 Elyn R. Saks, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 94 (2003).
3 Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L. REV. 945 (1991).
4 Elyn R. Saks, Multiple Personality Disorders and Criminal Responsibility, 25
U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 383 (1992).
5 See http://law.usc.edu/contact/contactlnfo.cfim?detaillD=300.
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differs from her previous works because it is written in the voice not of a
dispassionate observer but rather of someone who has a personal stake in
the topic.
In The Center Cannot Hold: My Journey Through Madness, Saks
recounts her own experience of schizophrenia, the most serious of all
mental illnesses. 6 Beginning with some "little quirks" in childhood 7 and
progressing to full-fledged psychosis by her first year at Yale Law
School, Saks's illness caused her doctors to predict early on that she
would be unable to complete law school and that over the course of her
life she would require extended hospitalizations. But not only did Saks
finish law school, she has fashioned both a successful academic career
and a fulfilling personal life.
Saks explains in the book's final chapter her motives for writing
about her illness, motives that include changing public perceptions about
people with schizophrenia and providing a hopeful example to others
diagnosed with this disease.8 As Part I of this Review explains, Saks's
book is certain to serve these ends. People whose only knowledge of
schizophrenia comes from movies and newspaper headlines (or
casebooks and law review articles) cannot help but recognize from
Saks's story that there is more to this illness than they previously
understood. But as Saks herself cautions, she is in many ways not
typical of people with schizophrenia. Appreciating some of the ways her
experiences differ from the experiences of many others diagnosed with
this illness might temper the optimism her story inspires with a bit of
realism. Part II presents such a discussion.
That Saks does not undertake a detailed comparison of her own
experiences to the experiences of others with schizophrenia does not mar
her book; the book is a memoir, not a psychology text. If the book does
have a fault, that fault is, as Part III proposes, the wholly (or very nearly
wholly) condemnatory way that it presents involuntary medication. Saks
herself was administered forced medication during one hospitalization,
and she consistently refers to that experience in uncompromisingly
disapproving terms. Without this forced medication, however, it seems
6 See Michael F. Hogan, Updated Schizophrenia PORT Treatment
Recommendations, 30 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 623, 624 (2004) (referring to
schizophrenia as "the most serious mental illness"); Steven M. Paul, The New
Pharmacotherapy of Schizophrenia, in CURRENT ISSUES IN THE
PHARMACOTHERAPY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA xvii (Alan Breier et al. eds., 2001)
("arguably the most severe and disabling of the major psychiatric disorders").
7 ELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD: MY JOURNEY THROUGH
MADNESS 11 (2007).
8 Id. at 330-31.
[Vol. 15:2
Autonomy and Acute Psychosis:
quite possible that Saks's life might have turned out much the way her
doctors predicted it would.9 And Saks not only criticizes her own forced
medication but questions involuntary medication generally, raising the
possibility that her book might help deny others the treatment they need
if they are to have any chance of achieving the kind of life that Saks's
book celebrates.
I. CONTRIBUTION
Schizophrenia is frightening, both to those who experience it and to
those who only witness its manifestations. The word "schizophrenia"
does not mean "split personality," despite a seemingly endless supply of
misuses that would suggest that it does.10 Instead, it means "split
mind""-not a mind that has been sliced into two functional pieces but a
mind that has shattered; 12 a mind in which thoughts and feelings are
disconnected; a mind that produces meaningless speech, that sees and
9 Or worse. Schizophrenia is associated with "an alarmingly high" risk of
suicide. Alan Breier, Introduction: A New Era in the Pharmacotherapy of
Psychotic Disorders, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 3, 3 (2001); see also ROBERT
M. JULIEN, A PRIMER OF DRUG ACTION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE
ACTIONS, USES, AND SIDE EFFECTS OF PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 377 (10th ed.
2005) (reporting that "approximately 10 to 15 percent of individuals with
schizophrenia take their own lives, usually within the first 10 years of
developing the disorder").
10 "Schizophrenia is probably the most misused psychological term in
existence." NEIL R. CARLSON, FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
452 (3d ed. 1995). A recent survey of newspaper articles found that "[t]he
range of metaphorical references to schizophrenia was striking." Kenneth
Duckworth et al., Use of Schizophrenia as a Metaphor in U.S. Newspapers, 54
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1402, 1404 (2003) (listing as "typical examples" such
references as "the weather turns schizophrenic-81 degrees one weekend, sleet
the next (Houston Chronicle)" and "the schizophrenia of a public that wants less
government spending, more government services and lower taxes (Washington
Post)"). It is not just writers of newspaper articles who make this mistake. See,
e.g., Ronald Benton Brown, The Cure for Scholarship Schizophrenia: A
Manifesto for Sane Productivity and Productive Sanity, 13 NOVA L. REV. 39
(1988); Courtland H. Peterson, Restating Conflicts Again: A Cure for
Schizophrenia?, 75 IND. L.J. 549 (2000).
11 See Duckworth et al., supra note 10, at 1402 ("The use of schizophrenia as a
metaphor for split personality began with Bleuler's conception of the disease as
a mismatch between mood and thought, given its Greek roots 'schizo' (split,
schism, or separated) and 'phrenos' (mind).") (citation omitted).
12 SAKS, supra note 7, at 328.
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hears things that do not exist, that believes things that cannot possibly be
true.13
The experience of schizophrenia is legitimately frightening. The
hallucinations and delusions, the distorted thinking and disorganized
behavior, combined with treatment options that even at their best rarely
alleviate these symptoms completely and never actually cure the
disorder, 14 all explain why Nature magazine once called schizophrenia
"arguably the worst disease affecting mankind."' 5 In her book, Saks not
only describes the facts of her psychotic symptoms-the faceless
creatures who wanted to kill her;16 the voices whispering her name;17 the
belief that other people had inserted thoughts into her head' 8-but she
also explains the terror that these symptoms cause: "My psychosis is a
waking nightmare, in which my demons are so terrifying that all my
angels have already fled."19
Schizophrenia also involves an additional kind of fear, an
illegitimate fear-the fear that anyone with this illness might at any
moment perform some random act of violence.20 At least two sources
13 According to the American Psychiatric Association, "The characteristic
symptoms of schizophrenia involve a range of cognitive and emotional
dysfunctions that include perception, inferential thinking, language and
communication, behavioral monitoring, affect, fluency and productivity of
thought and speech, hedonic capacity, volition and drive, and attention." AM.
PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 299 (4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
14 See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
15 Where Next with Psychiatric Illness?, NATURE, Nov. 10, 1988, at 95.
16 SAKS, supra note 7, at 129.
17 Id. at 99.
18Id. at 132.
19 Id. at 336. Saks offers this statement in the context of discussing why she
would welcome a pill that would magically cure her of schizophrenia, in
contrast to Rainer Maria Rilke's refusal of treatment for his bipolar disorder.
"The poet Rainer Maria Rilke was offered psychoanalysis. He declined, saying,
'Don't take my devils away because my angels may flee too."' Id. at 335-36.
20 The great majority of people with schizophrenia are, if anything, less prone to
violent behavior than are people in general. Ken Kress, An Argument for
Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons with Serious Mental Illness
Illustrated with Reference to a Proposed Statute for Iowa, 85 IOWA L. REV.
1269, 1284 (2000) ("Recent research demonstrates that most individuals with
mental illness are slightly less dangerous than the general public."). Some
research does support the argument, however, that people with schizophrenia
who are experiencing acute psychotic symptoms and not taking antipsychotic
medication are statistically more likely to commit violent acts. Id. (noting that
[Vol. 15:2
Autonomy and Acute Psychosis:
fuel this stereotypical belief: news reports of violent acts committed by
people with schizophrenia (nonviolence, in contrast, is apparently not
believed to be newsworthy, as it is not reported) 21 and popular media that
portray people with schizophrenia as violent.22 This illegitimate fear
adds to the already immense burden that most people with schizophrenia
bear,2 3 contributing to stigma and ostracization, to a lack of social
supports and of job opportunities, and to stresses of all kinds24 -stresses
that can trigger or intensify schizophrenia's symptoms. 25
"a very small percentage of individuals with mental illness who are
symptomatic, who are psychotic and perceive some threat to their well-being, or
who have at least partly lost control of their actions are substantially more
dangerous than the general public"); see also E. Fuller Torrey, Violent Behavior
by Individuals with Serious Mental Illness, 45 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 653, 659 (1994) ("The data, then, suggest that individuals with
serious mental illnesses are not more dangerous than the general population
when they are taking their antipsychotic medication. When they are not taking
their medication, the existing data suggest that some of them are more
dangerous.").
21 Michael Winerip, Bedlam on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 23, 1999, at
42 ("It is the most sensational cases of the untreated-turned-violent that make
headlines.").
22 "[M]ental illness in general and schizophrenia in particular have not fared
well in the American cinema. . . . [F]ilms have portrayed persons with
schizophrenia as homicidal maniacs or as hapless figures staring blankly at a
wall in a primitive version of a mental hospital." Glen 0. Gabbard,
Schizophrenia on Filmmaker's Canvas, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Oct. 5, 2006, at 6;
see also JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 77
(1981) (noting the "systematic exaggeration by the media of the crime rates of
the mentally ill").
23 A recent report by the Surgeon General's Office concludes that "active
psychosis seen in schizophrenia is equal in disability burden to quadriplegia."
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 4 (1999).
24 See Patrick Corrigan, How Stigma Interferes with Mental Health Care, 59
AM. PSYCHOL. 614, 616 (2004) ("People with mental illness are frequently
unable to obtain good jobs or find suitable housing because of the prejudice of
key members of their communities: employers and landlords."); Bruce G. Link
& Jo C. Phelan, Stigma and Its Public Health Implications, 367 THE LANCET
528, 528 (2006) ("The extent to which a stigmatised person is denied the good
things in life and suffers more of the bad things has been posited as a source of
chronic stress, with consequent negative effects on mental and physical
health."); David L. Penn & James Martin, The Stigma of Severe Mental Illness:
Some Potential Solutions for a Recalcitrant Problem, 69 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 235,
236 (1998) ("[S]tigmatization is generally associated with decreased
employment and housing opportunities, increased family stress, and conflictual
Winter 2008]
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Saks's book is an antidote to both kinds of fear. Her successes
provide hope to others diagnosed with this disorder, and to their families
and friends, that schizophrenia does not make living a full, rewarding
life impossible. Hard, certainly, but not impossible. More concretely,
Saks makes clear that even at her most impaired, the actions of other
people still mattered. Doctors and other mental health professionals who
treated her with disrespect caused her to feel the way anyone would
feel-angry, resentful, hurt. 26 Friends and family who came to visit
when she was in the hospital were important evidence that the voices
telling her she was worthless were wrong: "It was so easy to feel isolated
and alone here; each one of these people who cared enough about me to
come and visit gave me reason to hope that I was worth saving."27 And
more broadly, her book adds another person to the very short list of
public examples of sympathetic people with schizophrenia. 28 That the
feelings (from the public) regarding acceptance into the community.")
(references omitted).
25 See George Bartzokis, Schizophrenia: Breakdown in the Well-regulated
Lifelong Process of Brain Development and Maturation, 27
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 672, 676 (2002) (writing that "schizophrenia is
an acutely 'stress reactive' disease meaning that both the onset and the course of
the disease are often associated with environmentally produced psychological
stress"); William P. Horan et al., Stressful Life Events in Recent-Onset
Schizophrenia: Reduced Frequencies and Altered Subjective Appraisals, 75
SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 363, 363 (2005) (noting that "research strongly supports
the notion that stressful life events may trigger the exacerbation of psychotic
symptoms in schizophrenia"); Julian Leff, Over the Edge: Stress and
Schizophrenia, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 4, 1992, at 31 (discussing the view that
schizophrenia is "a manifestation of an underlying brain fault which renders the
individual very sensitive to environmental stress"); Joseph Ventura et al., A
Prospective Study of Stressful Life Events and Schizophrenic Relapse, 98 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 407, 407 (1989) ("Stressful life events have been
implicated in both the onset of initial symptomatology and the return of
psychotic episodes.").
26 SAKS, supra note 7, at 145.
27 Id. at 163.
28 John Nash is perhaps the only widely known public figure to have been
diagnosed with schizophrenia. A Princeton mathematician, Nash won the
Nobel Prize in Economics in 1994. His life is the subject of the 2001 movie, A
Beautiful Mind (Universal Studios/Dreamworks Pictures 2001). See also
SYLVIA NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND (1998) (book on which movie is based).
Other people have publicly discussed their experiences with schizophrenia,
although they have reached a relatively limited audience. For example, twin
sisters (one of whom has schizophrenia) co-authored a book, see PAMELA SPIRO
WAGNER & CAROLYN S. SPIRO, DIVIDED MINDS: TWIN SISTERS AND THEIR
JOURNEY THROUGH SCHIZOPHRENIA (2005), and several psychologists have
[Vol. 15:2
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public can now know her, a happily married law school professor,
cannot help but contribute to creating a more complete, less stigmatizing
image of what someone with schizophrenia is like.29 And that Saks
coming forth with her story might inspire others to do the same only
amplifies her contribution.
II. CAUTION
Several aspects of Saks's story are not typical of people with
schizophrenia. As Saks herself notes, many people do not have access to
the same level of resources as she has had; she also counts as unusual the
analysts she has worked with as well as her own stubborn streak. 30 But
there is more that is unusual about Saks's experience of schizophrenia.
First, she has been able to avoid most of the secondary, collateral
problems that often compound the terrible experience of psychosis,
problems such as substance abuse, incarceration, and homelessness.
And second, she has chosen-and responded well to, by her account-a
specific type of talk therapy, psychoanalysis, that has long been
considered ineffective if not counterproductive for people with
schizophrenia.
A. COLLATERAL DAMAGE AVOIDED
As horrible as Saks's experience of schizophrenia has been, for the
most part it has not led to additional horrors. For example, people with
schizophrenia often are also diagnosed with a substance use disorder.31
Saks did smoke cigarettes, 32 as do as many as 90 percent of people
written about their own schizophrenia, see, e.g., Frederick J. Frese, Mental
Illness, Treatment and Recovery: My Experience and Insight as a Consumer, 11
GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 83 (2000).
29 A more balanced view of people with schizophrenia will contribute to
reducing the stigma of this illness. "Stigma is further diminished when
members of the general public have contact with people with mental illness who
are able to hold down jobs or live as good neighbors in the community."
Corrigan, supra note 24, at 620.
30 SAKS, supra note 7, at 334.
31 The reasons why people with schizophrenia are especially likely to abuse
alcohol and other drugs are uncertain. Two currently popular theories are that
people with schizophrenia use these drugs to self-medicate and that people with
schizophrenia are unusually prone to addiction. See Geraldine Scheller-Gilkey
et al., Relationship of Clinical Symptoms and Substance Use in Schizophrenia
Patients on Conventional versus Atypical Antipsychotics, 29 AM. J. DRUG &
ALCOHOL ABUSE 553, 554-55 (2003) (discussing the self-medication and the
primary addiction hypotheses).
32 SAKS, supra note 7, at 31.
Winter 20081
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diagnosed with schizophrenia.33 Saks has, though, unlike about half of
all people with schizophrenia, 34 avoided using alcohol and other drugs
excessively. She thereby also has avoided further compounding the
difficulties she has faced. As one textbook notes, "Substance use is to
schizophrenia as lighter fluid is to fire." 35 More particularly, substance
use "is a powerful risk factor" for a long list of bad consequences,
including relapse of psychotic symptoms, hospitalization, violent
behavior, victimization, HIV infection, and illnesses such as hepatitis
C.36
Two other compounding problems that people with schizophrenia
often face are homelessness and incarceration. 37 Homelessness is ten
times more common among people with a psychotic disorder as
compared to the general population.38 And jails have come to be "the
33 JEFFREY A. LIEBERMAN ET AL., TEXTBOOK OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 384 (2006)
("An estimated 70%-90% of persons with schizophrenia smoke, whereas the
estimated prevalence in the United States general population is 25%.") (citation
omitted).
34 LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 33, at 385 ("As many as half of patients with
schizophrenia are affected by alcohol or drug use disorders."); Marvin S. Swartz
et al., Substance Use and Psychosocial Functioning in Schizophrenia Among
New Enrollees in the NIMH CATIE Study, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1110,
1110 (2006) ("Estimates of the prevalence of substance use disorders range
from 10 to 70 percent, depending on diagnostic assessment methods.").
35 Douglas Ziedonis & Connie Nickou, Substance Abuse in Patients with
Schizophrenia, in SCHIZOPHRENIA AND COMORBID CONDITIONS: DIAGNOSIS
AND TREATMENT 187, 187 (Michael Y. Hwang & Paul Bemanzohn, eds., 2001).
36 Swartz et al., supra note 34, at 1110.
37 Of course, all of these problems become interrelated. See Jeffrey Draine et
al., Role of Social Disadvantage in Crime, Joblessness, and Homelessness
Among Persons with Serious Mental Illness, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 565,
565-66 (2002).
38 Mark Olfson et al., Prediction of Homelessness Within Three Months of
Discharge Among Inpatients With Schizophrenia, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES
667, 667 (1999) ("The risk of becoming homeless for persons with
schizophrenia and related disorders is more than ten times greater than the risk
for the general population."); see also Robert W. Buchanan & William T.
Carpenter, Schizophrenia: Introduction and Overview, in 1 KAPLAN &
SADOCK'S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1096, 1098 (Benjamin
J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000) ("Patients with a diagnosis
of schizophrenia are reported to account for 33 to 50 percent of homeless
Americans."). The causal mechanism that links schizophrenia and
homelessness is not clear. Some research suggests that symptoms of
schizophrenia lead fairly directly to homelessness, while other research supports
a more indirect, "downward drift" theory. See Ramin Mojtabai, Perceived
[Vol. 15:2
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mental hospitals of last resort"; 39 for example, the more than 3,000
inmates who require daily mental health care make the Los Angeles
County jail "de facto the largest mental institution in the country."40
Homelessness and incarceration are undesirable enough experiences in
and of themselves, but for people with schizophrenia, the stresses of
these experiences can lead to the additional undesirable experience of
exacerbated psychotic symptoms. 41 Furthermore, being either homeless
or incarcerated often hinders access to appropriate treatment, leaving
people with schizophrenia who are living on the streets or in jails in the
worst of all possible worlds: increasingly ill, with diminished care. 42
Reasons for Loss of Housing and Continued Homelessness Among Homeless
Persons With Mental Illness, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 172, 172 (2005)
(describing direct and indirect theories of the relationship between
schizophrenia and homelessness).
39 MARVIN I. HERZ & STEPHEN R. MARDER, SCHIZOPHRENIA: COMPREHENSIVE
TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 275 (2002) (stating that "jails and prisons have
increasingly become surrogate mental hospitals for individuals with severe
mental illnesses"); Marisa Elena Domino et al., Cost Shifting to Jails After a
Change to Managed Mental Health Care, 39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1379,
1380 (2004) ("Just as public mental hospitals once served as the institutions of
last resort for the care and confinement of mentally ill persons, jails have
become the last secure environment in most communities for the control of
mentally ill persons when they are unmanageable and noncompliant.").
40 HERZ & MARDER, supra note 39, at 275.
41 See sources cited supra note 25; see also Gregory L. Acquaviva, Mental
Health Courts: No Longer Experimental, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 971, 980
(2006) ("While incarceration is unpleasant, inadequate mental health care
escalates the mentally ill's stressful ordeal, causing crises and a plethora of
avoidable problems."); Mark J. Heyrman, Mental Illness in Prisons and Jails, 7
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 113, 116 (2000) (discussing how the stress of
incarceration may trigger mental illness); Marjorie A. Silver, Lawyering and Its
Discontents: Reclaiming Meaning in the Practice of Law, 19 TOURO L. REV.
773, 803 (2004) ("[J]ail is the worst possible place for the mentally ill.
Imprisonment is enormously stressful, and the offenders decompensate
further.").
42 See John Richard Elpers, Public Psychiatry, in 2 KAPLAN & SADOCK'S
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 3185, 3192 (Benjamin J. Sadock
& Virginia A. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000) ("Securing and maintaining
appropriate living situations is a major problem for persons with mental illness.
Treatment is impossible if adequate housing, food, and clothing are not
available."); David P. Folsom et al., Prevalence and Risk Factors for
Homelessness and Utilization of Mental Health Services Among 10,340 Patients
With Serious Mental Illness in a Large Public Mental Health System, 162 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 370, 370 (2005) ("Although the rates of mental and physical
illnesses are high among homeless persons, their access to health services is
Winter 2008]
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B. ANALYSIS AND PSYCHOSIS
Saks writes that "[p]sychoanalysis was by no means the obvious
treatment for my illness." 43 Indeed, psychoanalysis remains a
controversial therapy for people with schizophrenia.4 4 As developed in
the late 1800s by Sigmund Freud, psychoanalysis aims to alleviate
psychological distress by providing insight into the unconscious sources
of the distress. 45 The essential ingredients of Freudian, or classical,
psychoanalysis are (in addition to a couch 46) an analyst who elicits and
interprets the contents of the patient's unconscious mind, and a patient
who reveals the contents of her unconscious mind through such
processes as dream recording and free association.4 7 The key to the
analytic relationship is transference, a process whereby the patient
projects onto the analyst feelings that more properly belong to
relationships with other people, especially early caregivers such as
parents.4 8 Psychoanalysis is an intensive as well as extensive-and
expensive-kind of therapy, often consisting of fifty-minute "hourly"
sessions four or five days per week for many years.
Freud himself did not advocate psychoanalysis for treating psychotic
disorders. Instead, Freud considered psychoanalysis appropriate only for
more difficult. They often do not have a regular source of health care, and the
daily struggle for food and shelter may take priority over mental health care.")
(references omitted); Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons are Brim-Full of the Mentally
Ill: Is Their Incarceration a Solution or a Sign of Failure?, 11 GEO. MASON U.
Civ. RTS. L. J. 157, 157 (2000) ("[I]n jails and prisons.., psychiatric treatment
... is sub optimal, if it exists at all.").
43 SAKS, supra note 7, at 187.
44 HERZ & MARDER, supra note 39, at 195 ("In recent years there has been a
great controversy over the relative efficacy of psychodynamically oriented
psychotherapy versus supportive therapy.").
45 See STEPHEN A. MITCHELL & MARGARET J. BLACK, FREUD AND BEYOND: A
HISTORY OF MODERN PSYCHOANALYTIC THOUGHT 5 (1995) ("As his clinical
experience grew, Freud realized that what was most crucial to a permanent
removal of symptoms was for the objectionable, unconscious material to
become generally accessible to normal consciousness.").
46 The purpose of the couch is to aid transference. See NANCY MCWILLIAMS,
PSYCHOANALYTIC DIAGNOSIS: UNDERSTANDING PERSONALITY STRUCTURE IN
THE CLINICAL PROCESS 242 (1994) (explaining that "illumination of the
transference is the main reason that analysts continue to use the couch"); see
also infra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing transference).
47 MITCHELL & BLACK, supra note 45, at 5-9.
48 Id. at 53 (noting that "Freud viewed the transference as the centerpiece of the
analytic process, providing access to the patient's hidden and forbidden wishes
as she expressed and tried to gratify them with the analyst").
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people experiencing symptoms of neuroses. Freud divided the world of
psychological disorders into two types: psychotic and neurotic, with loss
of contact with reality as the defining feature of a psychotic disorder.49
People with schizophrenia are, Freud thought, poor candidates for
psychoanalysis because of their impaired relationship to the external
world, and in particular their inability to form a proper transference
relationship with an analyst. 50  As the American Psychoanalytic
Association explains, "The person best able to undergo psychoanalysis is
someone who, no matter how incapacitated at the time, is basically, or
potentially, a sturdy individual." 51
For many modem mental health professionals, most of whom are
neither trained psychoanalysts nor especially allegiant to Freud's
theories,52 a more pressing concern than impaired transference are
empirical studies reporting that psychoanalysis is not an effective
therapy for people with schizophrenia. Most empirical research has
concluded that supportive reality-based psychotherapy, which addresses
the everyday problems of living with schizophrenia, produces better
outcomes than insight-oriented psychotherapy, such as psychoanalysis,
which focuses on understanding the meaning of schizophrenia's
symptoms.5 3  The few studies that set out to demonstrate
psychoanalysis's effectiveness seem to have failed. 54
49 Id. at 152 ("Freud distinguished between the 'transference neuroses,' which
included various analyzable neurotic conditions like obsessionalism and
hysteria, and the 'narcissistic neuroses,' which included various psychotic
conditions like schizophrenia and severe depression that were not amendable to
the analytic process.").
50 See id. at 87 ("Freud's patients were neurotic; he considered psychosis
inaccessible to analytic treatment, because the totality of emotional withdrawal
it entailed made impossible a transference of repressed oedipal wishes and fears
onto the person of the analyst."); see also W.W. MEISSNER, FREUD AND
PSYCHOANALYSIS 223-28 (2000).
51 http://apsa.org/aboutpsychoanalysis/askapsychoanalyst/treatment/tabid/255/D
efault.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
52 For example, a 2001 study of the theoretical orientations of a group of
psychologists who practice psychotherapy found that only 7.9% identified
themselves as psychoanalytic, with an additional 20.9% self-reporting as
psychodynamic. John C. Norcross et al., Psychologists Conducting
Psychotherapy in 2001: A Study of the Division 29 Membership, 39
PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH, PRACTICE, TRAINING 97, 99 (2002).
53 The American Psychiatric Association's Practice Guideline for the Treatment
of Patients with Schizophrenia does not recommend psychoanalysis at all, and
does not recommend any psychotherapy until the "stable phase." Am.
Psychiatric Ass'n, Practice Guideline for the Treatment of Patients with
Winter 2008]
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An additional problem for non-Freudians is the psychoanalytic idea
that unconscious energy is the source of schizophrenia's symptoms-the
idea that, as one of Saks's analysts explained it, she was "talking about
threatening and scary ideas" (that someone was trying to kill her; that her
brain would explode) because she felt threatened and scared herself:
"The violence is your defense against fear."55 Or as Saks summarizes,
"my psychosis served to protect me from painful thoughts and
feelings." 56 Some psychotherapists reject the idea that any good can
come from trying to find meaning in psychotic symptoms. 5 7 Even those
Schizophrenia, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY (FEB. 2004 SuPP.) 2, 6 (2004). During
the acute and stabilization phases, only supportive therapy is recommended. Id.
at 4-5. See also Anthony F. Lehman et al., Translating Research Into Practice:
The Schizophrenia Patient Outcomes Research Team (PORT) Client Survey,
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 1, 7 (1998) ("Individual and group psychotherapies
adhering to a psychodynamic model (defined as therapies that use interpretation
of unconscious material and focus on transference and regression) should not be
used in the treatment of persons with schizophrenia .... [T]here is a consensus
that psychotherapy that promotes regression and psychotic transference can be
harmful to persons with schizophrenia.").
54 See GLEN 0. GABBARD, PSYCHODYNAMIC PSYCHIATRY IN CLINICAL
PRACTICE 189 (4th ed. 2005) ("Despite a rich clinical tradition of individual
psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy of schizophrenia, research studies
have been hard pressed to demonstrate that the average schizophrenic patient is
likely to reap significant benefit from such efforts.") (citation omitted); Douglas
Turkington et al., Cognitive Behavior Therapy for Schizophrenia, 163 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 365, 365 (2006) (noting that "a series of controlled trials
conducted in the 1960s and 1970s showed that psychoanalytically oriented
psychotherapy was ineffective, and at times even harmful, for patients with
schizophrenia").
55 SAKS, supra note 7, at 190.
56 Id. at 213.
57 See DAVID G. KINGDON & DOUGLAS TURKINGTON, COGNITIVE THERAPY OF
SCHIZOPHRENIA xi (2005) ("[M]any practitioners continue to believe that the
content of psychotic symptoms should be ignored and that any psychological
work... is liable to lead to increased distress and exacerbation of symptoms, as
a result of having opened up disturbing areas."). A good number of scholars
find the whole psychoanalytic enterprise suspect. See, e.g., EDWARD ERWIN, A
FINAL ACCOUNTING: PHILOSOPHICAL AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES IN FREUDIAN
PSYCHOLOGY 296 (1995) ("Has the effectiveness of Freud's therapy been
established? No. How much of his theory has been confirmed? Virtually none
of it."); Frederick Crewes, The Verdict on Freud, 7 PSYCHOL. SCl. 63, 68 (1996)
(arguing that "there is literally nothing to be said, scientifically or
therapeutically, to the advantage of the entire Freudian system or any of its
component dogmas"). Although psychoanalytic theory originated with Freud,
other theorists have proposed variations on Freud's ideas. These later theories
differ in detail from Freud's theories but retain the general psychodynamic idea
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who believe that attempts to understand schizophrenia's symptoms can
be therapeutic are apt to disagree with the details of psychoanalytic
theory, such as its focus on early childhood experiences. 58 Cognitive-
behavioral therapists, for example, might focus on the present meaning
of psychotic symptoms, such as delusional beliefs, encouraging people
with schizophrenia to express those beliefs so that their reality can be
tested and alternative explanations can be considered.59 Cognitive-
behavioral therapy and psychoanalysis are similar in that the goal of both
is to understand psychotic symptoms; these therapies are different,
though, in the type of understanding that is sought.60
Saks has nothing but praise for psychoanalysis, even if at times she
had difficulty with some particular aspects of a particular analytic
relationship. And if outcome is assessed at the end of her story, then the
years of psychoanalysis must be considered a success. But at various
points along the way, Saks's experience with psychoanalysis might
instead serve as evidence against the efficacy of psychoanalysis for the
treatment of schizophrenia. For example, of her treatment with Mrs.
Jones, her analyst in England, Saks writes: "As helpful as my
relationship with Mrs. Jones was proving to be, the intensity of what I
was feeling for her opened a kind of door, and the psychotic thoughts
marched right through it, growing more and more violent every
session." 61
Saks might respond to the observation that at times psychoanalysis
seemed to be making her psychotic symptoms worse, not better, by
proposing that the purpose of psychoanalysis is not (or is not only) to
alleviate the symptoms of psychosis in the short term but to understand
the unconscious forces that are causing the symptoms. Or in more
psychoanalytic terms, she might say that understanding the symptoms is
cathartic-that understanding the symptoms is necessary for not merely
(the idea that the psyche consists of different levels that interact), and include
the work of among others Carl Jung, Erik Erikson, Karen Homey, Erich
Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan. See MITCHELL & BLACK, supra note 45, at
21.
58 For Freudians, the present is important primarily for what it reveals about the
past. See STEPHEN A. MITCHELL, INFLUENCE AND AUTONOMY IN
PSYCHOANALYSIS 83 (1997) ("The patient only seems to live in the present;
within their psychic reality, their inner world, patients are still living and
struggling with the parents of their childhood, their infantile sexual and
aggressive conflicts, the childhood fantasies and dreads.").
59 Turkington et al., supra note 54, at 367-68.
60 See id.
61 SAKS, supra note 7, at 96.
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alleviating but eliminating them.62 To those who disagree with the basic
principles of psychoanalytic theory, such responses are likely to be
unsatisfactory. But that Saks credits so much of her success to
psychoanalysis might cause some who have dismissed this therapy out
of hand perhaps now to give it a second look. At the very least, Saks's
successful experience with psychoanalysis should lend support to
recommendations that treatment for schizophrenia include not only
pharmacological therapies-namely, antipsychotic medication-but also
non-pharmacological, psychosocial therapies as well.
III. CRITIQUE
Overcoming schizophrenia to the fullest extent possible very likely
requires, over the course of the illness, both talk therapy and
antipsychotic medication. Antipsychotic medications usually can
alleviate some if not most of the acute symptoms of schizophrenia, but
these drugs possess important limitations, particularly the potential to
cause serious side effects. Furthermore, becoming not just less sick but
truly well-or, as Saks says, "finding a life" 63-takes more than
medication. What, though, of people who refuse treatment for
schizophrenia? When if ever is involuntary treatment justified?
Presently, an assortment of legal rules governs the administration of
involuntary treatment-rules that specify different criteria for
involuntary medication than for involuntary hospitalization, for example,
and different rules for people who are competent to make their own
treatment decisions than for people who lack this competency.
Behind these legal rules is a philosophical commitment to the
primacy of individual autonomy. In short, involuntary treatment is
viewed as bad because it does not respect individual choices, and not
respecting individual choices is viewed as essentially the same thing as
not respecting the personhood of the choice-maker. But a close
examination of the relationship between individual autonomy and
involuntary treatment raises several difficult questions. For example,
does administering involuntary medication to someone whose psychotic
symptoms prevent him from even knowing that he is experiencing
symptoms of psychosis advance or infringe autonomy? And which is
worse, compromised autonomy or unmedicated psychosis?
Threads of these questions are present in Saks's account of her life
with schizophrenia. Saks spent enormous energy attempting to avoid
antipsychotic medication; the enormity of her desire to be free of the
62 See MITCHELL & BLACK, supra note 45, at 4.
63 SAKS, supra note 7, at 336.
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medication was perhaps equaled only by the enormity of the successes
she achieved while taking the medication. In her book, Saks has nothing
good to say, directly, about involuntary medication. Indirectly, though,
her experiences say a great deal about what is at stake when someone
refuses treatment for acute symptoms of psychosis.
A. IN VOL UNTARY MEDICA TION." UNMITIGATED EVIL OR LESSER OF EVILS?
1. Medication Ambivalence: Needed and Unwanted
Medication, and Saks's "intense ambivalence" toward it,64 occupies
a central place in her story. Several particular issues fuel this
ambivalence, issues such as whether antipsychotic medication is
anything more than a crutch for a weak will, whether the harmfulness of
medication's side effects outweighs the desirability of diminished
psychosis, and whether medication should ever be administered without
consent.
By the end of the book, Saks seems to have recognized that trying to
resist psychotic symptoms with willpower alone is like trying to hold
back the ocean with a broom. 65 She also seems to have decided, after
numerous opportunities to compare life with medication's side effects to
life with schizophrenia's symptoms, that for her the side effects are
preferable to the symptoms. 66 Unlike the question of willpower, the
question of side effects is objectively difficult. Antipsychotic
medications as a class of drugs possess numerous flaws: they never
actually cure psychotic disorders;67 they rarely alleviate psychotic
symptoms completely; 68 and they always pose a risk of side effects,
64 SAKS, supra note 7, at 214.
65 Id. at 304.
66 Id. at 334.
67 GERALD C. DAVISON & JOHN M. NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 344 (9th
ed. 2004) (noting that antipsychotic medications are "not a cure" for
schizophrenia); LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 33, at 303 ("antipsychotic drugs
do not cure schizophrenia"); see also SUSAN NOLEN-HOEKSEMA, ABNORMAL
PSYCHOLOGY 359-60 (2d ed. 2001) ("People with schizophrenia typically must
take neuroleptic drugs prophylactically-that is, all the time to prevent new
episodes of acute symptoms.").
68 HERZ & MARDER, supra note 39, at 76 ("All forms of schizophrenia improve
with antipsychotics. However, the extent to which patients improve varies
considerably. Whereas many patients improve to the point that they are nearly
free of psychotic symptoms, others continue to manifest severe positive
symptoms."); LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 33, at 327 ("For the great majority
of patients, medications help with symptom control but do not clearly preserve
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some exceptionally debilitating,69 some permanent, 70 and some life-
threatening. 71  Many people, though, like Saks, eventually find a
medication regimen that has a combination of symptom-alleviating and
side effect-producing properties they can live with. Still, the goal is
always the smallest symptom-alleviating dose possible. 72 For many
reasons-because schizophrenia tends to be an episodic illness;
7 3
because long-term use of a particular medication sometimes diminishes
its effectiveness,74 or causes new side effects to develop, or old side
effects to intensify75-questions concerning antipsychotic medication
rarely can be addressed and answered once and for all. Thus, even
or restore premorbid levels of social and vocational functioning and do not lead
to normal functioning.").
69 Perhaps the worst of the acute side effects is akathisia. "Akathisia,
characterized by a state of subjective and motor restlessness, is a common and
unpleasant side effect of antipsychotic medication. Case reports have described
both suicidality and violence as being precipitated by this distressing condition."
E. Cem Atbaoglu et al., The Relationship of Akathisia With Suicidality and
Depersonalization Among Patients With Schizophrenia, 13 J.
NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 336, 336 (2001); see also
JULIEN, supra note 9, at 353 (describing akathisia as "a syndrome of the
subjective feeling of anxiety, accompanied by restlessness, pacing, constant
rocking back and forth, and other repetitive, purposeless actions").
70 The most well-known potentially permanent side effect is tardive dyskinesia,
which causes involuntary movements that can be severely disabling. See
JULIEN, supra note 9, at 353.
71 Id. at 362 ("[T]he greatest concern with clozapine is the risk of developing
severe, life-threatening (although reversible) agranulocytosis.").
72 See DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 67, at 346 ("Current clinical practice calls
for treating patients with the smallest possible doses of drugs.").
73 See id. at 319 ("People with schizophrenia typically have a number of acute
episodes of their symptoms; between episodes they often have less severe but
still very debilitating symptoms.").
74 See Howard C. Margolese et al., Therapeutic Tolerance and Rebound
Psychosis during Quetiapine Maintenance Monotherapy in Patients with
Schizophrenia and Schizoaffective Disorder, 22 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 347, 352 (2002) (discussing development of
therapeutic tolerance as a result of long-term administration of a particular
antipsychotic); Anne-Noel Samaha et al., "Breakthrough" Dopamine
Supersensitivity during Ongoing Antipsychotic Treatment Leads to Treatment
Failure over Time, 27 J. NEUROSCIENCE 2979, 2984-85 (2007) (discussing
possible neuronal bases for diminished efficacy of antipsychotics).
75 See Stephen R. Marder, Schizophrenia: Somatic Treatment, in 1 KAPLAN &
SADOCK'S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1199, 1209 (Benjamin
J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000) ("Concerns about the long-
term adverse effects of antipsychotic medications ... have led to a search for
methods of treating patients with the lowest effective dose of medication.").
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people who have come to terms with their need for antipsychotic
medication must cope with the possibility of perpetual adjustment and
re-adjustment of their medication. 76
If medication presents difficult practical questions when someone
with schizophrenia seeks it voluntarily, medication presents equally
difficult philosophical questions when someone with schizophrenia
refuses this treatment. Saks was administered forced medication during
one hospitalization, several months after she started law school. 77 In the
book's narration of this time, Saks describes the experience as "brutal." 78
Even by the book's end, despite such intervening statements as
"medication kept me alive,"79 Saks's view of involuntary medication has
changed little if at all: "And I know better than most how the law treats
mental patients, the degradation of being tied to a bed against your will
and being force-fed medicine you didn't ask for and do not understand. I
want to see that change, and now I actively write and speak out about the
crying need for that change." 80
Saks's suggestion that being administered forced medication was an
unmitigated evil-degrading and nothing else-is troubling. In her case,
even given the exceptionally harmful circumstances under which she
was forced to take antipsychotic medication-harmful physically and
harmful psychologically-the medication arguably produced a large
amount of good. Large enough even, it might well seem to Saks's
readers at least, to justify its harms.
Saks compares her experience in New Haven, where as a first-year
law student she was hospitalized and administered involuntary
medication, with her earlier experience when she was a graduate student
in England, where for long stretches of time her treatment consisted only
of sessions with her psychoanalyst, Mrs. Jones. "I had been cripplingly
ill in England. Psychoanalytic treatment kept me out of the hospital
while I actually completed my Oxford degree. In the States, in exactly
the same situation, I was hospitalized, tied up, and forced to drink foul
antipsychotic meds-a year of my life wasted."81
But this comparison is far from fair, as the situations were far from
exactly the same. In England, Saks's symptoms were mostly of
76 Lehman et al., supra note 53, at 5 ("Reassessment of the dosage level or the
need for maintenance antipsychotic therapy should be ongoing.").
77 SAKS, supra note 7, at 144-45.781Id. at 157.
79 Id. at 298.
80 Id. at 331-32.
8 Id. at 187-88.
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depression, at least initially.82 And when the psychotic symptoms did
emerge, it would be difficult to say that the treatment she received was,
at least in the short term, anything more than minimally effective. It did
keep her out of the hospital, but it did not cause the symptoms to abate:
The delusions expanded into full-blown hallucinations..
• Days went by when I simply could not bear to be
around anyone; unless I was with Mrs. Jones, I stayed
alone in my room, with the door locked and the lights
out .... For two straight years, I did my work, met my
obligations, made it through the day as best I could, and
then fled to Mrs. Jones, where I promptly took the chains
off my mind and fell apart.83
Additionally, the daily demands of law school were much different
than those she had faced in England. "Although Oxford had been
challenging, there hadn't been such constraints on my time and efforts
there. Within days of beginning my classwork at Yale, I was on a
treadmill that seemed to have no 'stop' button."84 As she worked to
complete her second law school writing assignment, Saks's psychotic
symptoms intensified. She asked her classmates if they had ever killed
anyone.85  Her speech became tangential, a jumble of words held
together by the loosest of associations. 86  After a meeting with a
professor, she climbed out of his office window and spent an hour on the
roof, laughing, and singing.87 When the professor took her to the
emergency room, her conversation with a hospital attendant was all
about killing-the people who had killed Saks (several times, in just that
one day); the possibility that the attendant might himself be the next
person killed.88 In the emergency room, she was restrained, forced to
swallow doses of an antipsychotic medication, and admitted to the
hospital on an emergency hold.8 9
Without question, it would have been far better had Saks consented
to the medication than been forced to take it. But nothing she writes
provides any confidence that she would voluntarily have taken that first
82 Id. at 57-100.
83 Id. at 99-100.
84 Id. at 122.
85 Id. at 136.
86 Id. at 137. For example, she reports that she told her classmates, "I think
someone's infiltrated my copies of the cases. We've got to case the joint. I
don't believe in joints. But they hold your body together." Id.
87Id. at 139.
88Id. at 143.
89 Id. at 145-46.
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dose of antipsychotic medication anytime soon, if ever. Her attitude
toward medication at that time was that "pills were bad, drugs were
bad."90 A short time before the hospitalization, Saks had visited the
student health center where the psychiatrist she saw encouraged her to
take an antipsychotic medication. Her response: "There was no way I
was going to take their stupid drug."91 She did begin sessions with a
psychoanalyst, and at their first meeting she asked him, "Are you going
to make me take pills? Because I don't want to do that. I cannot do that.
Drugs are bad, you know." 92
Despite the book's strong implication that given the chance Saks
would go back and undo the forced medication,93 she also writes that the
medication did help her, and did so quickly. In asking to be released
from the restraints, Saks told one of the doctors that the medication was
working, that her thinking was clearer: "And, in fact, it was."94 The
improvement continued, so that "after weeks of steady medication, the
psychosis was beginning to lift." 95 After several months, Saks was well
enough to leave the hospital.
When Saks returned to law school the next fall, the psychotic
symptoms also returned, quickly and forcefully, even though she was
meeting with an analyst four times a week.96 This time, she decided to
take the antipsychotic medication voluntarily (although still quite
reluctantly). Whether Saks would have come to this decision absent the
previous year's involuntary medication and hospitalization can never be
known for sure, but her earlier absolutist "drugs are bad" stance is cause
for serious doubt. The forced medication cut through what otherwise
might have remained a vicious circle: she could not know the benefits of
the medication unless she took it, but she could not decide to take it
unless she knew the benefits.
90 Id. at 123.
91 Id. at 126.
92Id. at 133.
93 In addition to the passage about wanting to change the laws regarding
involuntary medication, see supra text accompanying note 80, Saks also
explains that she chose to write her Note for the Yale Law Journal on the topic
of restraints in part because "on some level, I wanted the words on the page to
do the impossible-go back and change the outcome for that young woman
[herself] tied to a bed at the Yale Psychiatric Institute and Yale-New Haven
Hospital's MU1M." SAKS, supra note 7, at 212.
94 SAKS, supra note 7, at 151.95 Id. at 176.
96Id. at 193.
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2. The Legal Rules: Least Restrictive Alternatives, Decisional
Competency, Substituted Judgment, and More
Knowledge of antipsychotic medication's benefits is just one
component of a voluntary decision to take such medication. Another,
even more essential, component is a recognition that schizophrenia's
symptoms-the people no one else sees, the voices no one else hears, the
beliefs no one else shares-are just that: symptoms of an illness. Many
people with schizophrenia lack this insight.97 They do not recognize that
the voices, for example, are hallucinations; they believe that no one else
can hear the voices because the voices' messages are meant especially
for them, or that other people only claim not to hear the voices because
those people are participants in vast government-sponsored conspiracies
to cover up the truth about the voices. Saks writes that for many years,
she believed that everyone had the same kind of odd experiences as she
did.98 The only difference, she believed, was that other people dealt with
these experiences more effectively.
Recently, researchers who study the issue of insight among people
with schizophrenia have proposed that lack of awareness of psychotic
symptoms is a kind of neurological impairment, similar to the lack of
awareness of a physical disability, such as blindness or paralysis, that
people with other brain illnesses and injuries, such as a stroke or
Alzheimer's, sometimes experience. 99  This research pointing to a
97 See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 13, at 304 ("A majority of individuals with
schizophrenia have poor insight regarding the fact that they have a psychotic
illness."); DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 67, at 342 (noting that "many patients
with schizophrenia lack insight into their impaired condition and refuse any
treatment at all"); June R. Husted, Insight in Severe Mental Illness: Implications
for Treatment Decisions, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 33, 39 (1999)
("Impaired insight is a very common symptom of schizophrenia.").
98 SAKS, supra note 7, at 93.
99 Xavier F. Amador & Andrew A. Shiva, Insight into Schizophrenia:
Anosognosia, Competency, and Civil Liberties, 11 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS.
L.J. 25, 27-28 (2000) ("Poor insight in schizophrenia bears remarkable
similarities to anosognosia in neurological disorders. Patients with
schizophrenia who have poor insight, and neurological disorder patients with
anosognosia, exhibit the following characteristics: a very severe lack of
awareness of their illness, the belief persisting despite conflicting evidence,
confabulations to explain the observations that contradict their belief that they
are not ill, and a compulsion to prove their self-concept."); see also Xavier F.
Amador et al., Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia and Schizoaffective and
Mood Disorders, 51 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 826, 828-29 (1994); J.P. McEvoy
et al., Why Must Some Schizophrenic Patients Be Involuntarily Committed? The
Role of Insight, 30 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 13 (1989).
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neurological basis for poor insight regarding schizophrenia's symptoms
contradicts earlier theories about lack of insight, particularly theories
proposing that lack of insight is psychologically motivated, whether as a
type of unconscious defensiveness such as denial, or as a conscious
choice.1 00
Lack of insight is the most common reason why people with
schizophrenia refuse treatment, 01 but it is not an adequate legal ground
for administering involuntary treatment. There are two traditional types
of involuntary treatment for mental illnesses, hospitalization and
medication, each with its own set of criteria. Every state allows
involuntary hospitalization when someone, because of a mental illness,
is dangerous to himself or to other people.102 Most states also allow
involuntary hospitalization when someone is "gravely disabled,"
meaning (usually) that he is unable to provide for his own basic needs
100 See Kress, supra note 20, at 1274 n. 19 (referencing psychological theories of
lack of insight).101 Peter F. Buckley et al., Lack of Insight in Schizophrenia: Impact on
Treatment Adherence, 21 CNS DRUGS 129, 133 (2007) ("Lack of insight is the
main cause of treatment nonadherence in patients with schizophrenia."); The
Treatment of Schizophrenia: Making it Work, HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER,
June 2007, at 4 ("The main reason for neglecting medication is lack of insight
into the illness.").
102 See Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The "Fit" of Expert Predictions
in Civil Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 29 (2003) ("Every state has enacted
a form of civil commitment law."); Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity:
Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV.
1199, 1246 n. 172 (2000) (noting that "[e]very state allows commitment of those
who are mentally ill and dangerous").
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such as food, clothing, and shelter.103 These statutes are based on the
state's parens patriae power and its police power1 04
But someone who satisfies the criteria for involuntary hospitalization
might not satisfy the criteria for involuntary medication. Many courts
have ruled that involuntary treatment must be the "least restrictive"
means of achieving whatever government interest is justifying the
involuntary treatment.105  And traditionally, courts have regarded
103 See Scherr, supra note 102, at 55 ("An increasing number of states permit
commitment on a finding that the person is 'gravely disabled."'); Ilissa L.
Watnik, Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of Kendra's Law: New York's
Solution for Treatment of the Chronically Mentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1181,
1191 (2001) (noting that "many states have incorporated either a 'passive harm'
(deterioration) standard or a 'gravely disabled' or 'unable to provide for basic
needs' standard into their civil commitment laws"). Most states define gravely
disabled only in terms of physical survival. A few states, though, include
psychological well-being. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)(2.e) (West 2008)
(defining dangerous as including "severe mental, emotional or physical harm");
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-10 1(a)(ii)(c) (2007) ("serious mental debilitation [or]
destabilization from lack of or refusal to take prescribed psychotropic
medications for a diagnosed condition").
104 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) ("The state has a
legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its
citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves;
the state also has authority under its police power to protect the community
from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.").
105 See, e.g., Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
("Deprivations of liberty solely because of dangers to the ill persons themselves
should not go beyond what is necessary for their protection."); DeAngelas v.
Plaut, 503 F. Supp. 775, 780-81 (D. Conn. 1980) (holding state statute
unconstitutional "insofar as it fails to require findings ... that commitment of
the accused is the least restrictive alternative"); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp.
1022, 1028 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("[D]ue process requires that the state place
individuals in the least restrictive setting consistent with legitimate safety, care
and treatment objectives."); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 452-53
(S.D. Iowa 1976) (finding state law unconstitutional for "failing to require that
less restrictive alternatives be considered prior to ordering full-time
hospitalization"); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1103 (E.D. Wis.
1972) ("We conclude that the Wisconsin civil commitment procedure is
constitutionally defective insofar as it . . . fails to require those seeking
commitment to consider less restrictive alternatives to commitment."). Some
states also mandate the least restrictive alternative by statute. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 22-52-10.1(a) (2006) ("The least restrictive alternative necessary and
available for the treatment of the respondent's mental illness shall be ordered.");
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-540(B) (2003) ("The court shall consider all available
and appropriate alternatives for the treatment and care of the patient. The court
shall order the least restrictive treatment alternative available."); GA. CODE
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medication as more "restrictive" than hospitalization. 106 So someone
who is subject to involuntary treatment because he is a threat to his own
safety, for example, cannot be administered involuntary medication
unless involuntary hospitalization is ineffective in diminishing his
dangerousness.107
Additionally, many courts have ruled that involuntary medication
may not be administered, except in emergency situations, unless the
person to be treated is not competent to make his own decisions about
whether to consent to or to refuse medical treatment.108 The right of
ANN. § 37-3-161 (1995) ("It is the policy of the state that the least restrictive
alternative placement be secured for every patient at every stage of his medical
treatment and care."); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 450 5/3-811 (2004) ("The court
shall order the least restrictive alternative for treatment which is appropriate.");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09(l)(a) (2007) (mandating that "the court shall
commit the patient to the least restrictive treatment program or alternative
programs which can meet the patient's treatment needs").
106 See, e.g., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984) ("[L]ess
restrictive alternatives, such as segregation . . . should be ruled out before
resorting to psychotropic drugs."); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 844 (3rd Cir.
1981) ("[T]here is a difference of constitutional significance between simple
involuntary confinement to a mental institution and commitment combined with
enforced administration of antipsychotic drugs."); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d
650, 656 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[R]easonable alternatives to the administration of
antipsychotics must be ruled out."); In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40,
52 (Mass. 1981) ("We can identify few legitimate medical procedures which are
more intrusive than the forcible injection of antipsychotic medication."). Cf
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405 5/2-107.1 (a-5)(4)(F)(2005 & Supp. 2007) (requiring
that "other less restrictive services have been explored and found inappropriate"
before allowing involuntary medication).
107 See, e.g., Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238, 248 (Alaska 2006)
(reasoning that because "API has not maintained that Myers posed an imminent
threat of harm to herself or anyone else after she was committed for treatment at
API," the "state's power of civil commitment sufficed to meet its police-power
interest, so we fail to see how the issue of medication implicates the state's
police power at all"); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1980) ("If there is
no emergency, hospital personnel are in no danger; the only purpose of forcible
medication in these circumstances would be to help the patient. But the basic
premise of the right to privacy is the freedom to decide whether we prefer to be
helped, or to be left alone.").
108 See, e.g., Myers, 138 P.3d at 244 (interpreting state statute to mandate that
"the court may not authorize nonconsensual psychotropic medication if it finds
that the patient is presently competent; in such cases, the court must honor the
unwilling patient's wishes"); Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal.
Rptr. 199, 210 (Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]he task for the court is simply to determine
whether a patient refusing medication is competent to do so despite his or her
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competent people to refuse medical treatment has roots in both the
common law109 and the Constitution, 110 and every state now recognizes
this right by statute.111 Standards for determining competency to make
decisions about medical treatment range, in theory, from the mere
expression of a treatment decision to an actual appreciation of both the
diagnosed illness and the proposed treatment. 112 In reality, most states
have adopted amalgamated standards that require some sort of capacity
mental illness."); Rogers v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d
308, 314 (Mass. 1983) ("We conclude that a distinct adjudication of incapacity
to make treatment decisions (incompetence) must precede any determination to
override patients' rights to make their own treatment decisions."); Rivers v.
Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341, 341-42 (N.Y. 1986) ("[N]either the fact that
appellants are mentally ill nor that they have been involuntarily committed,
without more, constitutes a sufficient basis to conclude that they lack the mental
capacity to comprehend the consequences of their decision to refuse medication
that poses a significant risk to their physical well-being."); Steele v. Hamilton
County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 21 (Ohio 2000) (court must
find that "the patient does not have the capacity to give or withhold informed
consent regarding his/her treatment"); State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein 416
N.W.2d 883, 894 (Wis. 1987) ("While dangerousness may legitimately justify
the state's authority to involuntarily commit an individual, it does not justify the
abrogation of the individual's right of informed consent with respect to
psychotropic drugs.").
109 Justice Cardozo famously proclaimed, for example, that "[e]very human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."
Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
110 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ("The
principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions.").
" See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Beyond Misguided Paternalism:
Regulating the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1035, 1054-55 (1998) ("Today, all states and the District of Columbia have
recognized the right to refuse treatment through the enactment of a variety of
natural death statutes, including living will laws, durable power of attorney for
health care laws, do not resuscitate ("DNR") order laws, and health care
surrogate laws.") (footnotes omitted).
112 See Loren H. Roth, Alen Meisel & Charles W. Lidz, Tests of Competency to
Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 280 (1977) (discussing five
types of competency standards: "1) evidencing a choice, 2) reasonable outcome
of choice, 3) choice based on rational reasons, 4) ability to understand and 5)
actual understanding").
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to understand the diagnosis and the treatment.113 This requirement of
capacity for understanding, rather than actual understanding, means that
in some cases, someone with schizophrenia will be competent to refuse
treatment for psychotic symptoms that he does not know that he has. 14
In many states, there are yet more barriers to administering
involuntary medication even to someone who is incompetent to make his
own treatment decisions. The first is a substituted judgment standard of
decision-making for people who are incompetent.1 5 This standard
113 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4503 (2002 & Supp. 2007 ) ("Any person
of ordinary intelligence and awareness sufficient for him or her generally to
comprehend the need for, the nature of and the significant risks ordinarily
inherent in ... treatment ... is competent to consent thereto on his or her own
behalf."); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(l)(1) (LexisNexis 2005)
(defining as incompetent someone who is "unable to understand the nature,
extent, or probable consequences of the proposed treatment or course of
treatment, is unable to make a rational evaluation of the burdens, risks, and
benefits of the treatment or course of treatment, or is unable to communicate a
decision"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-22-10(12) (2002) ("'Patient unable to consent'
means a patient unable to appreciate the nature and implications of his condition
and proposed health care, to make a reasoned decision concerning the proposed
health care, or to communicate that decision in an unambiguous manner."); VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (2005) (defining as incompetent someone who is
"unable to understand the nature, extent or probable consequences of the
proposed medical decision, or to make a rational evaluation of the risks and
benefits of alternatives to that decision"); WIs. STAT. ANN. 51.61(1)(g)(4)(a)-(b)
(West 2008) (identifying as incompetent someone who either "is incapable of
expressing an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting
medication or treatment and the alternatives" or "is substantially incapable of
applying an understanding of the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to
his or her mental illness, developmental disability, alcoholism or drug
dependence in order to make an informed choice as to whether to accept or
refuse medication or treatment").
114 See, e.g., Virgil D. v. Rock County (In re Virgil D.), 524 N.W.2d 894, 895
(Wis. 1994) ("[A] patient may refuse the involuntary administration of
psychotropic drugs if, after a psychiatrist has adequately explained the
advantages and disadvantages of, and the alternatives to, medication or
treatment, he or she is able to express an understanding of the advantages,
disadvantages, and alternatives. The standard does not require the patient to
have an appreciation of the nature of his or her mental illness.").
"' See In re C.E., 641 N.E.2d 345, 354 (Il. 1994) (concluding that "section 2-
107.1 permits the court's consideration of the 'substituted judgment' of the
mental health recipient"); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1977) ("[W]e now reiterate the
substituted judgment doctrine as we apply it in the instant case."); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. 201 § 14(c) (West 2004) (mandating a substituted judgment
Winter 2008]
Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law
mandates that someone who is incompetent to consent to medical
treatment may be administered only those treatments that a surrogate
decision-maker concludes the incompetent person would choose, were
he competent to make such a choice.116  And psychiatric advance
directives may override whatever provisions a state has enacted
regarding the medical treatment of people who are incompetent to make
their own treatment decisions. Like medical advance directives, these
"psychiatric wills," as they are sometimes called, allow people while
they are competent to specify what treatments they do and do not wish to
receive should they become incompetent.117 The advance directive thus
replaces the decision of the surrogate with the now-incompetent person's
own decision that he made while he was competent. Every state
recognizes by statute the validity of advance directives for medical
treatment,11 8 and many states also explicitly recognize the validity of
advance directives for mental health treatment.1 19 Even in those states
that do not provide for an explicit statutory right, no court has rejected
psychiatric advance directives as per se invalid.1 20
standard); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.217 (2002) ("If the patient is unable
to make a rational and informed decision about consenting to or refusing the
proposed treatment, the court shall make a substituted judgment for the patient
as if he or she were competent to make such a determination.").
116 See United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 497 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Courts
employing substituted judgment have required that if a patient is medically
incompetent, the decision-maker must attempt to determine what the patient
would have done if he were competent."); In re C.E., 641 N.E.2d 345, 355 (Ill.
1994) (noting that the substituted judgment standard "requires the parties to
inquire into the values and preferences of the patient and attempt to make a
decision as the patient would, were he competent").
117 See Justine A. Dunlap, Mental Health Advance Directives: Having One's
Say, 89 Ky. L.J. 327, 345 (2000) ("Advance directives ... create a means by
which persons can communicate choices for a prospective period of
incompetence.").
118 Kellen Rodriguez, Suing Health Care Providers for Saving Lives, 20 J.
LEGAL MED. 1, 3 (1999) (reporting that "statutes have been enacted in every
state that provide legal mechanisms for a person to declare, in advance of a life-
threatening event or condition, the type of life-sustaining medical treatments
they would want taken if they become incapacitated").
"9 Breanne M. Sheetz, The Choice to Limit Choice: Using Psychiatric Advance
Directives to Manage the Effects of Mental Illness and Support Self-
Responsibility, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 408 (2007) ("Between 1991 and
2006, twenty-seven states enacted statutes authorizing psychiatric advance
directives in some form.").
12o Cf id. at 409-11 (discussing state and federal case law supporting the
validity of psychiatric advance directives); Elizabeth M. Gallagher, Advance
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In addition to the two traditional types of involuntary treatment,
hospitalization and medication, many states also provide for a type of
involuntary treatment variously called outpatient commitment, 121
assisted outpatient treatment, 122 and mandated outpatient treatment.123
Most outpatient commitment statutes do not change the criteria for
involuntary treatment; instead, they merely allow a court to order
someone who meets the criteria for involuntary treatment to receive that
treatment in either an inpatient or an outpatient setting.124 This most
common type of outpatient commitment is often referred to as "hospital
diversion."' 25  Additionally, "conditional discharge" outpatient
commitment allows someone to be released from inpatient treatment,
subject to the condition that he receive outpatient treatment.126 In some
Directives for Psychiatric Care: A Theoretical and Practical Overview for
Legal Professionals, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 746, 772 (1998) (discussing
reasons why courts are likely to find psychiatric advance directives valid).
121 See, e.g., Howard Telson, Outpatient Commitment in New York: From Pilot
Program to State Law, Report of the Bellevue Hospital Center Outpatient
Commitment Pilot Program, 11 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 41 (2000).
122 See, e.g., Kress, supra note 20.
123 See, e.g., Joel M. Silberberg, Terri L. Vital & S. Jan Brakel, Breaking Down
Barriers to Mandated Outpatient Treatment for Mentally Ill Offenders, 31
PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 433 (2001).
124 Marvin S. Swartz et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of Outpatient
Commitment in North Carolina, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 325, 325 (2001)
(reporting that "[i]n all but a small minority of states, the criteria for outpatient
commitment are identical to those for inpatient commitment"); see, e.g., IOWA
CODE ANN. § 229.14 § 229.14(1) (b)-(c) (West 2000) (allowing court to order
either inpatient or outpatient commitment); MONT. CODE ANN. 53-21-127
(2006) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. § 135-C:45 (2006) (same); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 426.130(l)(b)(C) (West 2003) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-80)
(1997) (same).
125 See, e.g., Joan B. Gerbasi et al., Resource Document on Mandatory
Outpatient Treatment, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 127, 129 (2000);
John Monahan et al., Mandated Community Treatment: Beyond Outpatient
Commitment, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1198, 1200 (2001).
126 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 632.385(1-2) (2000) ("The head of a mental
health facility shall release a patient, whether voluntary or involuntary, from the
facility to the least restrictive environment . . . when he believes that such
release is in the best interests of the patient .... Release to the least restrictive
environment may be conditioned on the patient receiving outpatient care as
prescribed by the head of the mental health facility from which the patient is
being released."); N.H. REV. STAT. § 135-C:50 (2006) ("The administrator of a
receiving facility may grant a conditional discharge under this chapter to any
person who consents, by an informed decision, to participate in continuing
treatment on an out-patient basis, who agrees to be subject to any rules adopted
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states, hospital diversion and conditional release outpatient commitment
statutes expand the scope (but not the reach) of involuntary treatment,
allowing administration of involuntary medication even to someone
who, although he satisfies the criteria for involuntary treatment, is
competent to make his own treatment decisions.1 27 In most states,
though, outpatient commitment statutes allow involuntary medication to
be administered only to someone who is incompetent to make his own
treatment decisions.128
In a few states, outpatient commitment statutes expand the reach of
involuntary treatment. Perhaps the best-known of these statutes is New
York's "Kendra's Law,"'129 which was enacted in response to the 1999
death of Kendra Webdale. 130 While standing on the platform in a New
York City subway station, Webdale was pushed onto the tracks by
Andrew Goldstein, who had a long history of schizophrenia but was not
taking any antipsychotic medication at the time.'3 ' Under "preventive"
or "early intervention" statutes like Kendra's Law, people who do not
satisfy the criteria for involuntary inpatient treatment may be committed
to involuntary outpatient treatment.132 Kendra's Law does not, however,
by the commissioner relative to conditional discharge, and who understands the
conditions of his discharge."); see also Paul F. Stavis, Conditional Discharge: A
Very Old Idea Whose Time Has Returned, 63 NEWSLETTER OF THE N.Y. STATE
COMMISSION ON QUALITY OF CARE, Apr.-May 1995, available at
http://www.cqcapd.state.ny.us/counselscomer/cc63.htm
(discussing conditional release).
27 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-602(2) (2007) (providing that "the person
shall be eligible for discharge subject to the obligation to participate in any
medically appropriate outpatient treatment, including, but not limited to,
psychotherapy, medication, or day treatment, under a plan approved by the
releasing facility and the outpatient qualified mental health professional").
128 See, e.g., ALASKA § 47.30.825(c) (2006) (providing that "[a] patient who is
capable of giving informed consent has the right to give and withhold consent to
medication and treatment in all situations that do not involve a crisis or
impending crisis"); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334E-l(a) (LexisNexis 2004)
("Before any nonemergency treatment for mental illness can commence,
informed consent . . .shall be obtained from the patient, or the patient's
guardian, if the patient is not competent to give informed consent.").129 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2006).
30 In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 482 (N.Y. 2004).
131 Id.
132 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.2 (2006) (listing as criteria for outpatient
commitment that "(i) the respondent is mentally ill; (ii) as a result of the mental
illness the respondent will, if not treated, continue to suffer mental distress and
will continue to experience deterioration of the ability to function
independently; and (iii) the respondent is unable to make a rational and
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allow administration of involuntary antipsychotic medication as part of
an outpatient commitment treatment plan. 133 The preventive outpatient
commitment statutes of most other states similarly do not provide for
involuntary medication, 34 although a few states' statutes do.135
informed decision as to whether or not treatment for mental illness would be
desirable"); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(12.1) (1995 & Supp. 2007) (authorizing
outpatient commitment for someone "(A) [w]ho is not an inpatient but who,
based on the person's treatment history or current mental status, will require
outpatient treatment in order to avoid predictably and imminently becoming an
inpatient; (B) [w]ho because of the person's current mental status, mental
history, or nature of the person's mental illness is unable voluntarily to seek or
comply with outpatient treatment; and (C) [w]ho is in need of involuntary
treatment"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126(1)(d) (2006) (listing as grounds for
commitment that "the respondent's mental disorder, as demonstrated by the
respondent's recent acts or omissions, will, if untreated, predictably result in
deterioration of the respondent's mental condition to the point at which the
respondent will become a danger to self or to others or will be unable to provide
for the respondent's own basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, health, or
safety"); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 122C-263(d)(1)(c) (West Supp. 2007)
(including as criterion for outpatient commitment that "the respondent is in need
of treatment in order to prevent further disability or deterioration that would
predictably result in dangerousness").
133 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(n) (McKinney 1999). Under Kendra's Law,
like most preventive outpatient commitment laws, see sources cited supra note
132, physicians may prescribe medications to people who are committed to
outpatient treatment, but absent a further court order (authorizing inpatient
commitment) no one may be forced to take medication. See N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 9.60(n) (McKinney 1999) (providing that "if [the] assisted
outpatient refuses to take medications as required by the court order . . . [a]
physician may consider such refusal or failure when determining whether the
assisted outpatient is in need of an examination to determine whether he or she
has a mental illness for which hospitalization is necessary").
"' See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5348(c) (West 1998 & Supp. 2008)
(providing that "[i]nvoluntary medication shall not be allowed absent a separate
order by the court"); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-129(b) (LexisNexis 2007)
(stating that "[n]o subject of the order shall be physically forced to take
medication or forcibly detained for treatment under a family court order for
involuntary outpatient treatment"); N.C. GEN. STAT. 122C-273(a)(3) (West
2000 & Supp. 2007) (stating "[imn no case may the respondent be physically
forced to take medication or forcibly detained for treatment unless he poses an
immediate danger to himself or others. In such cases inpatient commitment
proceedings shall be initiated").
13 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(12.2) (1995 & Supp. 2007) ("'Outpatient
treatment' means a program of treatment for mental illness outside a hospital
facility setting which includes, without being limited to, medication and
prescription monitoring . ) MONT. CODE ANN. 53-21-127(6) (2006) ("The
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Outpatient commitment is presently "the most contested issue in
mental health law."'136 Those who support outpatient commitment argue
that it is less restrictive and more effective than inpatient commitment,
allowing people to remain in the community while still receiving the
mental health treatment necessary to prevent them from becoming a
danger to themselves or others.' 37 In particular, advocates of outpatient
commitment believe that while people with schizophrenia generally are
no more likely to engage in violent behaviors than anyone else, the
opposite is true of people with schizophrenia who are both experiencing
acute psychotic symptoms and not taking antipsychotic medication: they
are especially likely to engage in violent behaviors. 138  Outpatient
commitment, its supporters argue, increases medication compliance (and
thereby decreases violent behaviors) in two ways: indirectly, by
mandating participation in some form of outpatient therapy, which
allows treatment providers to monitor and encourage medication
compliance; and directly, under some states' statutes, by providing
mechanisms for enforcing medication compliance.
Opponents of outpatient commitment contend that it infringes the
freedom, perhaps unconstitutionally, of people who are mentally ill
without providing any benefit, either to individuals who are committed
to outpatient treatment or to society. 139 Outpatient commitment might
court may authorize the chief medical officer of a facility or a physician
designated by the court to administer appropriate medication involuntarily if the
court finds that involuntary medication is necessary to protect the respondent or
the public or to facilitate effective treatment."); see also In re S.C., 15 P.3d 861,
862-63 (Mont. 2000) (rejecting petitioner's claim that district court erred in
authorizing involuntary medication without first determining that she was
incompetent to refuse treatment).
136 John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm
Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 401 (2006).
131 See Kress, supra note 20, at 1300-08 (discussing benefits of outpatient
commitment as compared to inpatient commitment, including enhancing liberty
and diminishing dangerousness); E. Fuller Torrey & Mary Zdanowicz,
Outpatient Commitment: What, Why, and for Whom, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES
337, 337-38 (2001) (writing that outpatient commitment can increase treatment
compliance, decrease incidents of violent behavior, and also decrease
hospitalizations).
138 See supra note 20.
139 See Michael Allen & Vicki Fox Smith, Opening Pandora's Box: The
Practical and Legal Dangers of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 52
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 342, 343 (2001) (proposing that "outpatient
commitment confers no apparent benefit beyond that available through access to
effective community services"); Jennifer Honig & Susan Stefan, Outpatient
Commitment Debate: New Research Continues to Challenge the Need for
[Vol. 15:2
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even be counter-productive, its opponents argue, because it diverts
resources from people who want treatment to people who do not.140
Empirical assessments of outpatient commitment programs have
reported mixed results. Many studies have found that outpatient
commitment is associated with such positive outcomes as decreased
frequency and duration of future hospitalizations and increased
compliance with outpatient treatment even once the commitment order
has ended.1 41 But almost all of these studies possess an important flaw:
nonrandom assignment of subjects to the experimental (outpatient
commitment) and control groups. 42 Two studies that did randomize
assignment reported differing results. One study, of people treated at
Bellevue Hospital in New York City, found that outpatient commitment
did not achieve any statistically significant benefits as compared to
intensive but voluntary outpatient treatment, 43 while the other study,
conducted by Duke University in North Carolina, reported that extended
outpatient commitment (longer than six months) decreased the incidence
of both hospitalizations and violent behaviors. 44  But despite the
improvement of their randomized designs, both the New York and the
North Carolina studies possess other methodological problems,
particularly with the (lack of) uniformity of outpatient services
Outpatient Commitment, 31 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 109,
122 (2005) ("[O]ur drive to provide mental health treatment to people who do
not want it must be constrained not only by concerns that to do so is ultimately
ineffective, but also by the realization that to do so may violate their rights.").
140 Allen & Smith, supra note 139, at 342 (arguing that "unless treatment
resources are consistently provided along with outpatient commitment, orders
for involuntary treatment may hurt the people most in need of voluntary mental
health services and supports by diverting limited resources from proven and
successful programs").
141 See, e.g., Mark R. Munetz et al., The Effectiveness of Outpatient Civil
Commitment 47 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1251, 1253 (1996); Gustavo A.
Fernandez & Sylvia Nygard, Impact of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment on
the Revolving-Door Syndrome in North Carolina, 41 HosP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 1001, 1004 (1990).
142 See Virginia Aldige Hiday, Outpatient Commitment: The State of Empirical
Research on its Outcomes, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 8, 12-14 (2003)
(discussing nonrandom assignment of early outpatient commitment studies).
143 Henry J. Steadman et al., Assessing the New York City Involuntary
Outpatient Commitment Pilot Program, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 330, 336
(2001).
'44 Swartz et al., supra note 124, at 329; Marvin S. Swartz et al., Can
Involuntary Commitment Reduce Hospital Recidivism? Findings from a
Randomized Trial with Severely Mentally Ill Individuals, 156 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1968, 1974 (1999).
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provided.145 The one consistent finding of outpatient commitment
research thus far has been that conducting a randomized, well-controlled
study is exceptionally difficult.
146
3. The Principle Behind the Rules
Legal rules that limit involuntary treatment are largely if not entirely
explainable in terms of autonomy.1 47  The desire to minimize
infringements of autonomy explains, for example, why dangerousness is
usually a necessary condition for involuntary hospitalization, 148 why
incompetency to make medical treatment decisions is almost always a
necessary condition for involuntary medication, 149 why "least restrictive"
is the typical standard for deciding among different possible types of
145 See Paul S. Appelbaum, Thinking Carefully About Outpatient Commitment,
52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 347, 348 (2001).
146 For a discussion of the hurdles researchers face in designing randomized,
controlled studies of outpatient commitment programs, see generally Marvin S.
Swartz et al., The Ethical Challenges of a Randomized Controlled Trial of
Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 24 J. MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN. 35 (1997);
see also Hiday, supra note 142, at 13-15.
147 See Marsha Garrison, The Empire of Illness: Competence and Coercion in
Health-Care Decisionmaking, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 799 (2007)
("[V]irtually every aspect of medical decision making can be, and typically is,
analyzed in terms of patient autonomy. Autonomy has come to play a
'preemptive role' in discourse about patient decision making and care."); see
also Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986) ("[W]here notions of
individual autonomy and free choice are cherished, it is the individual who must
have the final say in respect to decisions regarding his medical treatment in
order to insure that the greatest possible protection is accorded his autonomy
and freedom from unwanted interference with furtherance of his own desires.");
John D. Arras, Physician Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: A Tragic View, 13 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 361, 381 (1997) ("[T]he imposition of medical
treatment against one's will represents a violation of personal autonomy and
physical integrity totally incompatible with the deepest meaning of our
traditional respect for liberty.").
148 See Elyce H. Zenoff & Alan B. Zients, If Civil Commitment is the Answer for
Children, What Are the Questions?, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 171, 205 (1983)
("A 'dangerous to self or others' standard usually governs the involuntary
commitment of adults on the ground that society should respect the autonomy of
those who do not want treatment, unless they are likely to harm someone.")
(footnote omitted).
149 See Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 341 (ruling that people who are involuntarily
hospitalized may still refuse medication so long as they are competent because
the right of self-determination "extends equally to mentally ill persons who are
not to be treated as persons of lesser status or dignity because of their illness")
(citation omitted).
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involuntary treatment,150 and why "substituted judgment" is the
generally accepted standard for surrogate decision-making. 5 1
Arguments that involuntary treatment is undesirable because it
compromises autonomy often presuppose a conception of autonomy as
nothing more than the act of making a (competent) choice.1 52 According
to such a view, respecting people's choices is tantamount to respecting
them as persons, and therefore people who are competent to make their
own treatment decisions should be allowed to choose to refuse treatment,
regardless of the likely consequences. People are permitted to make all
sorts of foolish, reckless, misconceived, or otherwise inadvisable
decisions; refusing treatment for acute psychotic symptoms is essentially
no different than eating Big Macs for lunch every day, participating in
such activities as hang gliding, sky diving, bungee jumping, snow
boarding, and rock climbing, or failing to save enough money for
retirement. That the government does not override these other choices
means that it should not override the choice to refuse treatment for
psychotic symptoms.153
150 See Watnik, supra note 103, at 1185-86 ("The doctrine of the least restrictive
alternative (or least restrictive environment or setting) refers to treatment in a
setting that preserves the individual's freedom and autonomy to the greatest
extent possible.").
' See In re Guardianship of Brandon, 424 Mass. 482, 497 n.22 (Mass. 1997)
("The function of a substituted judgment hearing is to secure to incompetent
persons the same right to choose or reject treatment that is accorded to
competent persons by the law of consent."); Norman L. Cantor, The Bane of
Surrogate Decision-Making: Defining the Best Interests of Never-Competent
Persons, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 155, 179 (2005) ("In effect, the surrogate is
effectuating the previously competent patient's autonomy interest as best that
can be done, by making a substituted judgment about what the now-incompetent
patient would want done if able to choose.").
152 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against
Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54, 93
(1982) (arguing that "as long as a person is capable of expressing a preference
about hospitalization and treatment, the state should not be able to substitute its
judgment for that preference"); Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and
Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1756 (1992) ("[I]ndividuals
appreciate having their autonomy- respected and being allowed to exercise
choice.").
153 See Morse, supra note 152, at 95-96 ("[I]f we do not override even the most
horrendously irrational decisions of normal persons that endanger their lives or
the welfare of their families, we have no justification for authorizing a greater
deprivation of liberty for those who are termed mentally disordered.") (footnote
omitted).
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One response to the argument that involuntary treatment is
undesirable because it limits autonomy is to suggest that mental illness
might limit autonomy to a greater degree, or in a more important way,
than does involuntary treatment. As one group of psychiatrists has
argued, "Strategies for protecting the autonomy of patients who refuse
treatment must consider the erosion of autonomy that psychosis
produces."1 54 Judge David Bazelon similarly asked, "How real is the
promise of individual autonomy for a confused person set adrift in a
hostile world?"'155 Even the Supreme Court has noted that people who
are "suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in need of
treatment" are not "wholly at liberty."'156
Relatedly, some philosophers have proposed that autonomy is more
than just making choices. 57 True autonomy, they contend, must include
154 Harold I. Schwartz et al., Autonomy and the Right to Refuse Treatment:
Patients' Attitudes After Involuntary Medication, 39 Hosp. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 1049, 1054 (1988); see also COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
POLICY, GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, FORCED INTO
TREATMENT: THE ROLE OF COERCION IN CLINICAL PRACTICE, No. 137 at 43
(1994) ("[S]ometimes involuntary psychiatric treatment is necessary, can be
effective, and can lead to freedom from the constraints of illness." (quoted in
Darold A. Treffert, The MacArthur Coercion Studies: A Wisconsin Perspective,
82 MARQ. L. REV. 759, 776 (1999))).
155 David L. Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the
Adversary Process, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 897, 907-08 (1975); see also Paul S.
Appelbaum, Crazy in the Streets, in ETHICS OF PSYCHIATRY: INSANITY,
RATIONAL AUTONOMY, AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE 537, 547 (Rem B.
Edwards ed., 1997) ("Meaningful autonomy does not consist merely in the
ability to make choices for oneself. Witness the psychotic ex-patients on the
streets, who withdraw into rarely used doorways, rigidly still for hours at a time
... . Can the choices they make, limited as they are to the selection of a
doorway for the day, be called a significant embodiment of human
autonomy?").
156 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429-30 (1979) ("One who is suffering
from a debilitating mental illness and in need of treatment is neither wholly at
liberty nor free from stigma .... Such 'freedom' from involuntary commitment
and treatment for a mentally ill person would be purchased at a high price.").
157 See ALAN GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT 113 (1998) ("There is also a
positive phase of freedom, consisting in the power or ability to act as you
choose."); Alexander McCall Smith, Beyond Autonomy, 14 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 30 (1997) ("Enthusiasts of autonomy have sometimes
talked themselves into an almost existentialist position, portraying the value of
autonomy as lying in the mere capacity to make the choice rather than in the
capacity to make a fulfilling choice. They have, therefore, depicted autonomy in
a neutral light, as being desirable in itself, and not for what it can bring to a
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positive freedom-not merely freedom from external force (negative
freedom) but also freedom from internal constraint.1 58  Allowing
someone who is experiencing acute psychotic symptoms to refuse
treatment might promote negative autonomy but only by sacrificing
positive autonomy; or conversely, compelling treatment might sacrifice
negative autonomy but promote positive autonomy. Under this more
comprehensive view of autonomy, whether involuntary treatment is
justified might depend upon whether the gain in positive freedom
outweighs the loss in negative freedom.
This more comprehensive view of autonomy also provides a
principled rationale for disallowing, in some cases, the choice to refuse
treatment for an acute psychotic episode but not to disallow other kinds
of destructive choices. Although these other choices might in many
ways be equally as harmful as refusing treatment for psychotic
symptoms, many of these other choices do not destroy positive freedom.
The choice, for example, to consume excessive amounts of artery-
clogging food does not, at least in the short run and perhaps also in the
long run in many cases, preclude someone from achieving her most
life."); ONORA O'NEILL, SELF-LEGISLATION, AUTONOMY AND THE FORM OF
LAW 9 (2004),
http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/u-grads/Tripos/Ethics/course-material/selflegislati
on ult05.pdf ("Although some existentialists and libertarians have made bold
(and implausible) claims about the moral significance of autonomy, which they
see as mere, sheer individual choice, most advocates of this conception of
autonomy see it as (at most) one important moral value among others.").
158 Even theorist J.S. Mill, who supported limiting individual choices only on
account of harm to others ("[T]he only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others."), argued against respecting autonomous decisions
to become a slave. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in MILL: TEXTS
COMMENTARIES 121 (Alan Ryan ed., 1997) ("[A]n engagement by which a
person should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null
and void .... The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not
to be free."). Cf Thomas Hurka, Why Value Autonomy?, 13 Soc. THEORY &
PRAC. 361 (1987) ("To be autonomous ... is to direct oneself where different
directions are possible."). For cautions regarding the dangers of the positive
freedom concept, see ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS
ON LIBERTY 132 (1969); cf Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of
Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295, 304 (1991) (noting that positive freedom has
been criticized as "a controversial, dangerous, and question-begging
conception" of freedom). For background discussions of autonomy, see
generally THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY (John
Christman ed., 1989); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
AUTONOMY (1988); LAWRENCE HARWORTH, AUTONOMY: AN ESSAY IN
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS (1986).
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important, most self-defining 59 goals. Even someone far along the path
to a heart attack likely is able to pursue a vocation, participate in
friendships and romantic relationships, and decide how to raise his
children. The choice to refuse medication for schizophrenia is different.
Someone experiencing an acute psychotic episode likely is unable to do
any of these things. The choice to remain acutely psychotic can in effect
be the choice to give up the capacity to make choices.
There is another, arguably more straightforward, response to the
argument that not respecting a choice to refuse treatment for psychotic
symptoms is wrong because other bad choices are respected: the
response that refusing treatment is a worse choice.160 Legislatures have
disallowed a relatively small although not trivial number of choices
because those choices are especially harmful-choices such as to ride a
motorcycle without a wearing helmet or drive a car without wearing a
seatbelt, or to consume addiction-causing drugs such as cocaine and
heroin. 161 It is true that legislation disallowing these kinds of choices has
been justified to a large extent on relatively non-controversial economic
grounds; people who are injured in motorcycle and automobile
accidents, and people who are addicted to cocaine and heroin, cost
society a lot of money. 162 But disallowing these choices is perhaps better
159 Some philosophers might add "highest order" goals. See, e.g., DWORKIN,
supra note 158, at 15-16 (defining second-order preferences as "the choice of
the kind of person one wants to become"); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM 294 (1988) ("[P]eople have second-order goals, i.e. goals about what
kind of goals they should have.").
160 For a more extensive development of this argument, see generally Dora W.
Klein, Involuntary Treatment of the Mentally Ill: Autonomy is Asking the Wrong
Question, 27 VT. L. REV. 649 (2003).
161 One recently proposed list of such activities includes people's choices to ride
motorcycles without wearing helmets or drive cars without wearing seatbelts; to
use heroin, marijuana, cocaine, or LSD; to obtain a medical treatment
unauthorized by the Food and Drug Administration; to work more hours than is
permitted by the Fair Labor Standards Act; to be prostitutes or drug dealers; and
to clone themselves or their children. Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order
Perfectionism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2867, 2877 (2007).
162 See, e.g., Love v. Bell, 465 P.2d 118, 121 (Colo. 1970) (upholding
mandatory motorcycle helmet law in part because "[p]ersons often become
public charges because of their prolonged hospitalization for serious injury, and
families are often required to be supported by public welfare as a result of the
death of their breadwinner"); State v. Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d 677, 679 (N.D.
1969) ("[W]e are not convinced that the legislature may not take reasonable
measures to prevent persons from becoming public charges, which often is the
result of the costs of long hospitalization in brain injury cases."). The same is
true, of course, of people who refuse treatment for psychotic symptoms. See
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justified on the grounds that these particular choices risk causing an
unacceptably large harm to personal well-being. Whatever benefits
someone might experience from consuming heroin or riding a
motorcycle without a helmet simply cannot justify the pain and disability
of a narcotics addiction or a head injury. The same can, in some cases,
be said of disallowing the choice to refuse treatment for an acute
psychotic episode. Whatever benefit someone might experience from
refusing treatment might not be enough to justify the huge amount of
suffering that untreated psychosis can cause. 63
Additionally, in some cases a choice to refuse treatment amounts to
a choice to become a danger to self or others, or to become gravely
disabled. In the 1960s, large numbers of people were released from
psychiatric institutions. 164 This deinstitutionalization was made possible
by the development of medications that were at least somewhat effective
in treating the symptoms of schizophrenia, a disorder that had previously
been essentially untreatable.1 65 But the community mental health care
that was supposed to help people with schizophrenia manage their illness
outside of a hospital setting never materialized. 166  Today, the
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL (1999) available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter6/sec2.html
(estimating that the total indirect cost of schizophrenia from reduced or lost
productivity was almost $15 billion in 1990). A recent study concluded that in
1997 the total cost to Medicaid of inpatient admissions for treatment of
schizophrenia was approximately $806 million, with approximately $106
million attributable to "gaps in antipsychotic treatment." Steven C. Marcus &
Mark Olfson, Outpatient Antipsychotic Treatment and Inpatient Costs of
Schizophrenia, 34 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 173, 177 (2008).
163 See infra notes 172-173, 175, 177 and accompanying text.
164 JULIEN, supra note 9, at 346-48 ("Prior to 1950, effective drugs for treating
psychotic patients were virtually nonexistent, and psychotic patients were
usually permanently or semi-permanently hospitalized; by 1955, more than half
a million psychotic persons in the United States were residing in mental
hospitals. In 1956, a dramatic and steady reversal in this trend began. By 1963,
fewer than 220,000 were institutionalized."); see also LELAND V. BELL,
TREATING THE MENTALLY ILL: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 159-60
(1980).
165 See JULIEN, supra note 9, at 346-47; see also BELL, supra note 164, at 176-
77; JOHN Q. LAFOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE
FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 87
(1992).
166 See BELL, supra note 164, at 176-77; RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C.
ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: How PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
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experiences of some people with schizophrenia follow a predictable
cycle: acute psychotic symptoms causing behaviors that justify
involuntary treatment, involuntary treatment that alleviates the psychotic
symptoms at least to such a degree that involuntary treatment is no
longer justified, termination of involuntary treatment, and finally the
return of acute psychotic symptoms causing behaviors that justify
involuntary treatment. 167
This cycle has motivated many commentators to ask, "Why?"
168
Why does the law mandate waiting until someone becomes a threat to
his own or other people's physical safety, or becomes unable to provide
for such basic human needs as food and shelter, before allowing
involuntary treatment? And why, even under preventive outpatient
commitment statutes intended to reduce such cycling, are the
requirements for involuntary medication-by far the more effective
treatment for acute psychosis-no less stringent than the requirements
for involuntary hospitalization? The quick and ready answer to these
questions is that involuntary treatment, particularly involuntary
ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL 86-106 (1990); LAFOND & DURHAM, supra
note 165, at 153-54.
167 See Jan C. Costello & James J. Preis, Beyond Least Restrictive Alternative: A
Constitutional Right to Treatment for Mentally Disabled Persons in the
Community, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1527, 1532 (1987) (discussing the "revolving
door" treatment of some people who are chronically mentally ill). Andrew
Goldstein's history typifies the cyclical treatment histories of some people with
schizophrenia: in the three years before Kendra Webdale's death, Goldstein had
"received 199 days of inpatient and emergency room services, on 15 different
occasions, in six different hospitals." Commission Investigates Tragic Subway
Incident, 77 NEWSLETTER OF THE N.Y. STATE COMMISSION ON QUALITY OF
CARE, Fall-Winter 1999-2000, available at http://www.cqcapd.state.ny.us
/newsletter/77dix.htm.
168 See, e.g., Janet Kornblum, Families Often 'Lost' in Trauma of Mental
Illness: Stigma, Guilt, Denial Keep Common Signals in the Dark, USA TODAY,
Feb. 8, 2008, at lOD ("Because it is so difficult under most state laws to have a
person hospitalized, families often have to wait until there is an emergency ....
'And then you have to call the police or you have to call the crisis team at the
hospital to come into your house and take your family member to the hospital.
And I want to tell you that it's one of the most traumatic events that will ever
happen to you."'); Daniel Mosley, State's Mental Commitment Process is Too
Weak, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, July 25, 2007, at 9 ("It is a torturous
process. And every time she is taken to the hospital, she is handcuffed like a
criminal. Over the years, her baseline has become increasingly less lucid.
Waiting for her condition to reach a crisis every time before a round of
treatment cannot be helping."); Kate Stanley, Instead of Psychiatric Care, He
Got Jail, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), June 1, 2003, at 1 ("It's folly to
wait until someone with mental illness gets dangerous before stepping in.").
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medication, is inconsistent with respect for autonomy. 169 But is respect
for autonomy necessarily what someone in the midst of an acute
psychotic episode needs above all else?
B. AUTONOMYABOVE ALL ELSE?
In describing one of her scholarly works on consent to treatment,
Saks writes:
As someone who benefits from medication, I know that
the question of when one should be allowed to refuse is
a complicated one. But I also believe that individual
autonomy is vitally important, even precious-after all,
it's central to who we are as humans on the planet, with
free will and self-ownership. 170
Although Saks directly raises the issue of autonomy and involuntary
treatment only briefly, much of her book arguably serves as evidence
against the view that autonomy is the only value that matters in decisions
about involuntary treatment. From beginning to end, Saks's descriptions
of her life without medication paint a picture of unqualified suffering.
For example, her description of the night preceding the involuntary
medication and hospitalization:
My whole body shook as I made my way back to my
room. And once there, I couldn't settle down. I
couldn't sleep. My head was too full of noise. Too full
of lemons, 71 and law memos I could not write, and
mass murders that I knew I would be responsible for.
Sitting on my bed, I rocked back and forth, moaning in
fear and isolation.172
And her description of one of her last efforts to discontinue the
medication, many years later:
The days and nights were harder now. The sheer
physical effort of containing my body and my thoughts
felt like trying to hold back a team of wild horses. Sleep
was spotty, and filled with dreams that left me awake
169 See sources cited supra notes 147-15 1.
170 SAKS, supra note 7, at 262.
171 Lemons had become part of Saks's schizophrenic ideation. E.g., id. at 136
("'Come to the Florida sunshine bush! Where they make lemons. Where there
are demons."'); id. at 139 ("My head was buzzing. Lemons and memos and
mass murders.").
172 Id. at 138.
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and sweating in terror.... All around me were thoughts
of evil beings, poised with daggers.... The room was
full of swirling, taunting demons, forces coming through
the walls and ceiling. Ed couldn't see them, but I knew
they were there. Any minute now, something terrifying
would happen to us both.173
At the time she was forced to take antipsychotic medication, Saks
wanted a lot of things-she wanted to refuse medication, but she also
wanted to return to law school, to develop friendships, to someday have
a family of her own. 174  Almost certainly, those wants were
incompatible. Without medication, her illness would very likely have
worsened, she might well have drifted deeper into her delusions and
perhaps even become resistant to antipsychotic medication's effects. 175
How allowing Saks to refuse medication would have demonstrated
respect for her autonomy in anything except the most formalistic of
"' Id. at 272-76.
174 Id. at 168.
175 Early treatment is most likely to be effective. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note
13, at 309 (listing "treatment with antipsychotic medication soon after the onset
of the illness" as a factor associated with a better prognosis); HERZ & MARDER,
supra note 39, at 152 (reporting that "prolonged psychotic episodes may be
associated with enduring damage"); LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 33, at 316
("[A] delay in treatment of the first episode of schizophrenia and in the
treatment of acute exacerbations is associated with poorer clinical outcomes.")
(citations omitted); id. at 356 ("A meta-analysis of 42 research reports from 28
studies found that the shorter duration of untreated psychosis was associated
with greater response to antipsychotic treatment, including improvement in
severity of global psychopathology, positive symptoms, negative symptoms,
and functional outcomes.") (citations omitted). One researcher described the
need for early treatment this way:
Acutely active psychosis is a dangerous mental state, if not a medical
emergency, because of its aberrant experiences, loss of insight, and
distortions of judgment. It requires immediate treatment, including
antipsychotic medication, to reduce the danger of such distortions to
life and social network. The threat of chronically active psychosis is
time rather than mortality and stigma, time immersed in the negative
symptoms or cognitive distortions of disorder. If prolonged, it may
well create deficits that add to severity beyond the level ultimately
determined by the original brain pathophysiology.
Thomas H. McGlashan, Schizophrenia in Translation: Is Active Psychosis
Neurotoxic?, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 609, 613 (2006).
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senses is not clear.176  Furthermore, even if allowing her to refuse
medication would have demonstrated respect for her autonomy in some
meaningful way, it is still not clear why respecting her autonomy would
have been preferable to giving her a chance to return to school and to
seek out and participate in relationships. Why respect the one choice
that might well deny her all her other choices?
When Saks's doctors told her that they believed her prognosis to be
poor, that they expected she would be unable to return to school and
would instead spend large portions of her life hospitalized, they were not
being purposefully cruel or manifesting ignorance about the usual course
of a psychotic illness like hers. 177 In explaining how she has managed to
thrive in spite of schizophrenia when so many others with this disorder
do not, Saks credits the psychoanalysts she has worked with, as well as
her family's financial resources and her own stubbornness. 17 8 But a
reader might well wonder what kind of a difference any of those factors
would have made had Saks not been forced to take antipsychotic
medication. If the emergency room doctor had simply sent Saks back to
her dormitory and allowed her to proceed down her desired medication-
free path, no one can say for sure what turn Saks's story would have
taken at that point. But what is certain is that even with all the
advantages of her financial resources, all the talent of her analysts, and
all the strength of her personality, that story would not be the same story
she tells in The Center Cannot Hold.
CONCLUSION
In The Center Cannot Hold: My Journey Through Madness, there is
a great deal to admire and only a little to regret. Saks's book will
undoubtedly change the way that people think about schizophrenia,
diminishing the fear and stigma that surround this disorder. And that
psychoanalysis was part of Saks's story might well contribute to a re-
evaluation of that particular therapy's effectiveness in the long-term
treatment of schizophrenia. Whatever else psychoanalysis (or any other
176 "Formalistic" here means a conception of autonomy that includes nothing
more than the mere act of making a choice. See supra notes 157-158 and
accompanying text.
177 According to the American Psychiatric Association, "[e]ducational progress
[of someone diagnosed with schizophrenia] is frequently disrupted, and the
individual may be unable to finish school. Many individuals are unable to hold
a job for sustained periods of time and are employed at a lower level than their
parents ("downward drift"). The majority (60%-70%) of individuals with
[s]chizophrenia do not marry, and most have limited social contacts." DSM-IV-
TR, supra note 13, at 302.
178 SAKS, supra note 7, at 334.
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kind of talk therapy) might be able to do over the course of many years,
though, it is not an efficient weapon against the acute symptoms of
psychosis-the demons, the voices, the fog of confusion and
disorganization. Antipsychotic medication is far from a panacea. But to
someone who is in the firm grip of schizophrenia's most terrifying
symptoms, antipsychotic medication is the therapy that stands the best
chance, that offers the best hope. It would be regrettable if Saks's
criticisms of forced medication made it harder to provide this therapy to
others who are journeying through their own madness.
